011 min
The problem Postel's Law solves
Picture a team that runs a booking service. Partner companies send it requests, and the written specification says a date looks like 2026-03-14. One partner's software sends 2026-3-14 instead, with the leading zero missing. Any person would read that as the same date. The booking service rejects it anyway, because it checks every date against the exact pattern in the specification.
Now the partner's customers see errors when they try to book. The partner's engineers work at another company, on their own release schedule. The booking team cannot change that code, and customers will not wait for weeks. Every team that receives messages from software it does not control meets this situation sooner or later, usually through an API, the agreed way one program asks another for something.
Early Internet engineers answered this with Postel's Law, which splits the job in two. The booking team sends dates in exactly the form the specification gives, so any receiver can read them. And it accepts 2026-3-14 as the date it plainly is. The rest of the story follows this team, and shows what the rule fixes and what it breaks.
022 min
Where Postel's Law comes from
Jon Postel edited the January 1980 specifications for the Internet Protocol and for the Transmission Control Protocol, known as TCP. TCP is the set of rules that lets two computers send each other a reliable stream of data. The Internet Protocol specification that Jon Postel edited in January 1980 already told implementers to be careful in what they send and accepting in what they receive. It also gave a reason: programs written by different people from the same document will read it differently.
The specification explained the rule in plain terms. A program should send well-formed datagrams, which are single packets of data. It should accept any datagram it can interpret, without objecting to small technical errors, as long as the sender's meaning is still clear. The 1981 TCP specification states the rule in one line, as a general principle of robustness for TCP implementations.
"Be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from others."
Later writers call this Postel's Law or the Robustness Principle. Both names point to the same rule.
The first example: the shrinking window
The TCP specification applies the rule to a concrete case. In TCP, a receiver tells the sender how much more data it can take. That limit is called the window. A receiver may announce a large window and later announce a smaller one, without having received that much data. The specification calls this shrinking the window and strongly discourages it.
Under the rule, a TCP never shrinks the window itself, but it stays prepared for another TCP that does. Every later use of the law follows the same pattern. Each side follows the rule in what it sends, and each side copes with a program that breaks the rule.
032 min
Why Postel's Law is needed
Postel's Law exists because specifications leave gaps. Eric Allman, who wrote the Sendmail mail server, listed the ways this happens in his 2011 article on the principle. The text can be ambiguous. It can be clear but worded so that engineers misread it. It can leave out a situation, such as a hardware failure. It can assume things about the environment that later change. And implementers add features that the specification never defined.
Each gap lets two correct programs disagree. The rule gives every program a default for the gap. Send the one form that nobody could misread, and accept the readings you can still understand.
How the first InterOp settled the gaps
Allman describes the first InterOp conference, where vendors tested whether their implementations of NFS, a way for one computer to use files stored on another, worked together. For the first 11 days, a small number of engineers worked in one room to make their systems work together. Each vendor mostly tested against its own system and against Sun's, because Sun had built NFS.
Long nights went to arguments about what the specification meant. After the 11 days customers were let in, and most of the systems, but not all, worked with every other system. By the end, Allman says, the protocol was better understood, many bugs were fixed, and the standard was improved. He calls this the usual path for a standard that grows out of working implementations.
042 min
How Postel's Law works
Postel's Law gives the booking team's service two separate duties, and the duties work in opposite directions.
| Duty | What the booking service does | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Sending | Always writes dates as 2026-03-14 | Every receiver, strict or tolerant, can read it |
| Receiving | Accepts 2026-3-14 and converts it to 2026-03-14 | The meaning is clear, so refusing helps nobody |
| Receiving | Rejects 04/03/2026 | Two dates fit it, 4 March and 3 April, so the meaning is not clear |
When the partner's request arrives with 2026-3-14, a strict receiver rejects it and a tolerant one accepts it and converts the date to 2026-03-14.
The third row is the part that most summaries skip. Postel's wording limits tolerance to messages whose meaning is still clear. A receiver that guesses between two meanings is not applying the rule. It is choosing for the sender, and a wrong guess books the wrong day.
The first row matters just as much. Tolerance works only when someone is strict. If every program were careless in what it sent, receivers would have to guess at every message. The sender's strictness keeps the guessing to a minimum.
The rule also moves work instead of removing it. By accepting 2026-3-14, the booking team takes on the job of fixing the date. Tesler's Law describes this trade: complexity does not disappear, it moves to whoever handles it.
Two meanings of conservative
Allman shows a second use of the rule with a protocol he invented for the example. Version 1 has a field that a receiver should read only when a certain flag is set. Because a tolerant version 1 receiver does not check that field otherwise, version 2 can start using it for a new option without breaking old programs. A protocol can grow this way.
There is a problem. A version 1 program may sit between two version 2 programs and pass their messages along. If it clears the field, which looks like the careful choice for a sender, it breaks the new option. So a forwarder must pass on anything it does not understand. Allman concludes that the word conservative has two meanings that conflict, one for programs that send and one for programs that forward.
For the booking team, this means a newer partner may add a field the service has never heard of. The service ignores it for its own use, and any gateway in between forwards it unchanged.
051 min
Postel's Law on the web
The largest test of Postel's Law was the web. Early on, many people wrote pages by hand, and many pages had mistakes, such as tags that were never closed. A browser that refused such pages would have shown readers nothing. Browsers instead guessed what the author meant and drew the page.
Allman points out that browsers accept pages without closing tags, that this improper form became a de facto standard, meaning a practice everyone follows although no document requires it, and that the effect has been called specification rot. The cost was that each browser guessed a little differently. A page could look right in one browser and wrong in another.
The current HTML standard ends the guessing. It sets out how HTML documents are parsed, whether or not they are correct, so the repair of a mistake is written down and not left to each browser. The tolerance did not go away. It moved from private guesses into a public rule. A tolerant receiver is easier to live with when its tolerance is written down.
062 min
What Postel's Law costs, even done right
Postel's Law has a cost for the booking team, even when they follow it well. The partner still sends 2026-3-14, because nothing told them it was wrong. Say a second partner copies that format from the first partner's example code. The booking service now accepts two kinds of dates, and the specification names only one.
This is the first cost. A receiver that fixes a mistake silently removes the pressure on the sender to fix it. Allman describes a faulty program that survives only because every other program is liberal with it. Nobody finds out until a stricter receiver arrives or the protocol changes. Then the faulty program fails, and the cause sits in code that nobody has reviewed for years.
When the workaround spreads
RFC 9413, written for the Internet Architecture Board in 2023, gives a case from TLS, the protocol that encrypts web traffic. Some widely used TLS servers dropped the connection when a client's first message ended with an empty extension, so client programs had to avoid sending one. Every new client then had to repeat the workaround. The authors call this being bug-for-bug compatible, which means copying another program's mistakes so that your program can work with it.
When tolerance becomes the standard
Sometimes the tolerated behavior is written into the standard. SMTP, the protocol for sending email, was defined as a seven-bit protocol. Many programs handled eight-bit characters anyway, and much of the world came to rely on it, Allman says. A later SMTP extension wrote the eight-bit behavior into the standard.
Behaviour nobody defined
Hardware shows the same pattern. Allman recalls older minicomputers that did something useful when an instruction held a bit pattern that was supposed to be illegal. Some programmers found these effects and used them. On the DEC PDP-8, one instruction could ask for a shift left and a shift right together. On some models that cleared both the high-order and low-order bits, but on other models it did something else. Programs that depended on it broke when the hardware was upgraded.
072 min
Postel's Law and security
Postel's Law was written for a network where the other programs were trying to cooperate. Allman wrote in 2011 that the rule came under challenge because the world has become more hostile, not because implementers have become less capable. Today any message could come from an attacker.
The Internet standards already said so. The 1989 requirements for Internet hosts, RFC 1122, tell implementers to assume that the network is full of malevolent entities who send packets built to do the worst damage. The same document repeats Postel's rule for every layer of the protocols. Sassaman, Patterson and Bratus argued in 2012 that Postel's principle was not meant to ignore security, and that reading it as advice to trust network input would be wrong.
Two receivers, one message
A tolerant receiver can be safe alone. The trouble starts when two receivers read the same message and each repairs it differently. HTTP, the protocol of the web, shows how. A request often passes through a front server before it reaches the application server. The HTTP/1.1 specification warns that lenient parsing can lead to request smuggling when a message has several recipients that each decide for themselves how forgiving to be.
Request smuggling is a technique that uses differences in how recipients parse a message to hide extra requests inside an ordinary-looking one. The front server sees one request and checks it. The next server sees more than one.
A browser guessing the file type
Browsers show the same pattern with file types. A server states what a file is in its Content-Type header, but many servers state the wrong type. For years, browsers have tolerated servers that label files with the wrong type by examining the contents of the response as well. The MIME sniffing standard says this has caused security problems, because a browser can treat a response as a different type than the server intended. The risk is highest when a site lets users upload files and then serves them under a harmless type.
Where signed data needs strictness
Allman gives a rule for choosing where to be strict. Public certificates, the signed files that prove a website's identity, are written in BASE64, a text encoding that uses only 65 characters. If a certificate holds any other character, that could be an attack. A program that quietly skips unknown characters is too liberal. A program that handles digital signatures should be very strict about them.
081 min
What Postel's Law does not mean
People often summarize Postel's Law as accept everything. That reading is wrong in two ways.
First, the rule does not mean trust your input. Postel's wording limits tolerance to what you can interpret, and RFC 1122 asks implementers to expect hostile senders. A receiver should check what arrives, accept what it can understand safely, and reject the rest.
Second, the rule does not mean accept every legal value. Allman gives an example of the opposite mistake: many web sites refuse email addresses that contain a plus sign, although that is a legal and useful character. Those sites are too strict in what they accept, and their users pay for it. Being tolerant includes accepting what the specification allows.
092 min
Where Postel's Law is contested
Few critics want Postel's Law gone. They disagree about where it should stop.
Allman, writing in 2011, concluded that the rule must be applied in moderation. Being liberal in what you accept is part of what lets protocols be extended, he says, so insisting on perfect input everywhere would make new versions of a protocol nearly impossible to roll out.
Martin Thomson and David Schinazi take a stricter view in RFC 9413, published in 2023. They write that tolerating unexpected input is no longer considered best practice in all scenarios, and that the harm to interoperability builds up over time when programs silently accept faulty input. Their alternative is active protocol maintenance, where designers, implementers and deployers continuously improve the specification and the implementations together. When a deployed program deviates, the community fixes the program or the specification, and does not teach every receiver to hide the deviation.
Their position has limits, and the RFC says so. Some software is rarely or never updated, and where programs are not updated there is no opportunity to apply the practices it recommends.
Where does that leave a practitioner? If you can reach the sender and update your own code, treat tolerance as a short-term measure with a plan to remove it. If you cannot, as with devices in the field, tolerance may be the only option, and you should write it down and limit it to cases where the meaning is clear.
102 min
What Postel's Law means for your work
Postel's Law changes a different decision for each role.
- Engineers decide which deviations to repair and which to refuse. Repairable examples are extra spaces, a missing leading zero, and fields the code does not know. Refusable examples are anything with two meanings and anything that carries a signature. The choice is built into the tools. Go's standard JSON decoder ignores keys that match no field unless the code asks for an error.
- Product managers own the tolerance policy as a product decision. They decide which formats a signup form accepts and which partner mistakes support will tolerate, and they decide when a tolerated mistake stops being tolerated.
- Designers apply the rule in both directions. A date field can accept 14 March 2026 and 2026-03-14, and then show the date it understood so the person can confirm. That is tolerant in what it accepts and exact in what it shows. This is also where Error Prevention comes in, because the form can often stop the mistake before it happens.
- Founders decide how much partner breakage they can afford. A tolerant integration gets the first partner live sooner. The cost arrives later, as more partners depend on the mistake.
That last cost has a name. Hyrum's Law says that with enough users of an API, every behavior you can observe will be depended on by somebody. Once partners rely on the service accepting 2026-3-14, removing that behavior breaks them.
111 min
Applying Postel's Law
Say the booking team applies Postel's Law and decides to keep the tolerance but control it. They write the accepted variations into their own documentation, so the leniency is part of the contract and not a surprise. The service converts 2026-3-14 to 2026-03-14 on arrival and uses only the converted value afterwards, so the rest of the code never sees two formats.
They count how often each repair happens and tell the partner, because a partner who learns about the mistake can fix it. They keep rejecting 04/03/2026, with an error message that names the format they expect. And when the count for a repair falls to zero, they remove it.
None of this is unusual. The plan follows the rule in both directions and adds two things that keep tolerance safe: a record of every repair, and an end date.
121 min
Postel's Law vs. nearby concepts
Postel's Law is easy to confuse with ideas that ask for the opposite, or that act at a different moment in a message's life.
| Concept | What it asks for | How it differs |
|---|---|---|
| Fail fast | Stop at the first sign of an error | Postel's Law repairs what it can understand. Fail fast refuses everything unexpected. |
| Poka-Yoke | Design so the mistake cannot be made | It acts before the message exists. Postel's Law acts after a flawed message arrives. |
| Hyrum's Law | Expect users to depend on every observable behavior | It describes a consequence of tolerance. It is not advice. |
The deciding fact is the moment each idea acts. Poka-yoke works on the sender, Postel's Law works on the receiver, and fail fast is the receiver's stricter option. A team can use all three. They prevent mistakes where they can, tolerate harmless variations where they must, and refuse anything whose meaning is unclear.
?3 questions
Questions people ask
Is Postel's Law the same as the Robustness Principle?
Who was Jon Postel?
Does Postel's Law apply to software that reads the replies of AI language models?
§11 sources
Sources
Show all 11 sourcesHide sources
Postel, J., Ed. (January 1980). RFC 760: DoD Standard Internet Protocol.
Postel, J., Ed. (September 1981). RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol.
Braden, R., Ed. (October 1989). RFC 1122: Requirements for Internet Hosts, Communication Layers.
Allman, E. (2011). The Robustness Principle Reconsidered. Communications of the ACM, 54(8). A copy of the article.
Sassaman, L., Patterson, M. L., and Bratus, S. (2012). A Patch for Postel's Robustness Principle. IEEE Security & Privacy, March/April 2012.
Thomson, M., and Schinazi, D. (June 2023). RFC 9413: Maintaining Robust Protocols. Internet Architecture Board.
Fielding, R., Nottingham, M., and Reschke, J., Eds. (June 2022). RFC 9112: HTTP/1.1.
WHATWG. MIME Sniffing Standard.
WHATWG. HTML Standard, section 13.2: Parsing HTML documents.
The Go Authors. Package encoding/json.
Wright, H. Hyrum's Law.





